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Shaffer v. Heitner:
Holding, Implications, Forebodings
By STEFAN A. RIESENFELD*
Issues, Decision and the Court's Opinions
On June 24, 1977, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Shaffer v. Heitner,' which spelled out important constitutional limita-
tions on the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by the courts of the
United States based on the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. Because of the sweeping statements in the major-
ity opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall, and the reservations contained in
the separate concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice
Stevens, as well as in the partly concurring and partly dissenting opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Brennan, the decision was bound to create doubts
and perplexity in the lower courts. The cases decided in the wake of
Shaffer v. Heitner2 fully confirm the early prognostication. Although
an attempt to delineate the contours of what remains of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction, like an attempt to trace the permissible scope of in per-
sonam jurisdiction, might be premature if not futile, the time does seem
ripe to have a searching look at Shaffer v. Heitner in the mirror of its
judicial aftermath.
The case as considered by the Highest Bench presented a narrow
issue: the constitutionality of Delaware's sequestration statute,3 as ap-
plied in the instant case. The litigation consisted of a shareholder's de-
rivative suit, against a Delaware corporation and a number of present
and former directors or officers thereof, brought in the Court of Chan-
cery for New Castle County, Delaware by Heitner, a nonresident own-
er of one share of stock in the corporation. All of the individual
defendants were nonresidents, but the majority of them did own stock
or options in the defendant corporation. At the time he filed his com-
* Dr. Jur., 1932, Breslau; Dr. Jur., 1934, Milan; LL.B., .1937, University of Califor-
nia; S.J.D., 1939, Harvard. Professor, University of California, Berkeley.
1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. The cases are discussed at text accompanying notes 23-43 infra.
3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1975).
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plaint, plaintiff obtained a court order for the sequestration of defend-
ants' stock rights, which under the law of Delaware have their situs in
that state regardless of the location of the certificates.4 The sequestra-
tion was executed by service on the Delaware corporation, and the in-
dividual defendants were notified of the commencement of the suit by
certified mail and by publication. The defendants appeared specially,
moving to quash the service of process and vacate the sequestration
order on two grounds: first, that the ex parte sequestration, having
been executed without prior notice and hearing, violated due process,
and, second, that Delaware's exercise of jurisdiction likewise violated
due process because of the lack of sufficient contacts of the defendants
with Delaware.
The Court of Chancery held that the Delaware sequestration act
did not entail a deprivation of such severity as to require prior notice
and hearing, and that the presence of the stock rights in Delaware con-
stituted a constitutionally sufficient basis for the exercise of quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, 5 holding that
Delaware's sequestration procedure provided due process and that the
exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by Delaware in the instant case
did not violate constitutional restrictions on the exercise of jurisdiction
by a state. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed on
the ground that "Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction over appellants in
this case is inconsistent with [the] constitutional limitation on state
power,"' 6 as enunciated by the Court.
Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority composed of him-
self, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Stewart, and White,
held applicable to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction as well as to in personam
jurisdiction the requirement that the defendant have sufficient contacts
with the forum to satisfy the traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice, as laid down in the seminal International Shoe Co.7
case. Therefore, the opinion continued, ordinarily the mere presence of
assets in a state fails to provide a proper jurisdictional basis for actions
not arising out of disputes relating to such assets, even where the juris-
diction over such actions is limited to the quasi-in-rem type. Broadly
speaking, the majority's opinion rejects the notion that on principle
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction can constitutionally rest on contacts, such as
the mere presence of property, that would not support in personam ju-
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1975).
5. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
6. 433 U.S. 186 at 216-17.
7. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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risdiction in the same action, and mandates the application of the same
tests for both forms of jurisdiction.8 The concurring opinions of Jus-
tices Powell and Stevens sharply criticized the majority's superimposi-
tion of the standards governing in personam jurisdiction upon quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction. The former expressly reserved judgment "on whether
ownership of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and
permanently located within a State may, without more, provide the
contacts necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within a State
to the extent of the value of the property." 9 In other words, Justice
Powell did not wish to foreclose the retention of quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion based solely upon the presence of property permanently located in
the state (prompting, necessarily, a question as to the degree of perma-
nency required). Justice Stevens concurred with this suggested excep-
tion, and emphasized further that the disposition of the case before the
Court did not call for the "invalidating of other long-accepted methods
of acquiring jurisdiction over persons with adequate notice of both the
particular controversy and the fact that their local activities might sub-
ject them to suit."10
Even the broad language of the majority opinion, however, calls
for caution not to overestimate the effects of the changes in the law
wrought by the judgment:
(1) Shaffer v. Heitner does not abolish quasi-in-rem jurisdiction; the
opinion holds only that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction must be predi-
cated on constitutionally adequate minimum contacts consisting
of more than the mere presence of property, except where the
action relates to such property.
(2) The Court overruled Pennoyer v. Neff, Harris v. Balk,12 and
their progeny only "to [the] extent that the prior decisions are
inconsistent with [the] standard [of minimum contacts eluci-
dated by International Shoe]."'13
(3) The opinion expressly reserved the question of "whether the
presence of a defendant's property in a state is a sufficient basis
for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plain-
tiff,' 4 without, however, explaining the meaning of that caveat.
(4) The opinion conceded that the presence of assets may constitute
8. "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evalu-
ated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 433 U.S. at
212.
9. Id. at 217.
10. Id. at 219.
11. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
12. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
13. 433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
14. Id. at 211 n.37.
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a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in any one of
several possible situations:
(a) the property is present because of an effort to avoid the
owner's obligation;
(b) its purpose is merely the attachment of the property "as
security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the
litigation can be maintained consistently with International
Shoe";'
(c) the action is based on a sister state judgment and is
brought to collect it out of local assets; 16
(d) or, finally, the presence of the property demonstrates that
the owners located it in the forum State for the express
purpose of invoking the benefits and protection of its
laws. I
Accommodation of these special situations could greatly limit the
extent to which the new rule effects a change in the prior law, especially
if they are broadly construed. 18 Moreover, other factors may possibly
call for additional qualifications. Perhaps one of the most important
problems left open is the effect of the plaintiffs residence in the forum.
Both Pennoyer v. Neff and Harris v. Balk dealt with the exercise of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction for the benefit of a resident plaintiff, a cir-
cumstance noted 19 but not specifically assessed by the majority opinion.
Undoubtedly, the crucial rationale for the Court's decision is the
conclusion that the limited scope of a quasi-in-rem money judgment,
which precludes its collectibility from assets not seized as basis of juris-
diction,20 is in itself an inadequate ground for considering the presence
of the seized assets to be a sufficient minimum contact to support exer-
cise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Unhappily, the Court obscures this
rationale by confusing the limited effect of a quasi-in-rem judgment
15. Id. at 210.
16. Id. at 210 n.36.
17. Id. at 216 (quoting from Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Justice
Brennan refers to the same statement in his opinion. 433 U.S. at 228.
18. The Court expressly refused to examine the facts of the cases decided on the ratio-
nales of Pennoyer and Harris in order to determine whether jurisdiction might have been
sustained under the new standard. 433 U.S. at 212 n.39. The Court, however, intimated that
the new analysis might "result in significant changes" in cases where the property, which
until Heitner served as basis for state-court jurisdiction, is completely unrelated to the plain-
tiff's cause of action and the presence of the defendant's property does not suggest the exist-
ence of other ties. Id. at 208-09.
19. Id. at 197 (quoting from Pennoyer); id. at 200 (discussing the status of Epstein in
Harris v. Balk).
20. A quasi-in-rem judgment, being a judgment with the execution permanently stayed
except against assets attached at the time of the commencement of the action, is not entitled
to full faith and credit in a sister state with respect to personal liability. S. RIESENFELD,
CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 395 (2d ed. 1975).
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with a limitation on the size of the claim being litigated.
2
'
In view of the Court's amorphous recognition of special factors
that may render the presence of assets not the sole basis of jurisdic-
tion,22 as well as the inherent difficulties in the application of the mini-
mum contacts test, Shaffer v. Heitner has already produced a rich
harvest of cases illustrating the uncertainties caused by the new ap-
proach to the standards of fair play and substantial justice.
Subsequent Developments in the Case Law
The significance of Heitner, beyond its operation as a potential ir-
ritant, can best be judged on the basis of the judicial labors prompted
by its new gospel. The presentation will follow the points raised in
connection with the discussion of the opinion above.
Is Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction "Scuttled"?
The survival of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction (subject to the minimum
contacts test of International Shoe Co.) was discussed and affirmed in
Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc. 23 In that case the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction over a nonresident obtained under the New York attach-
ment provisions24 was not vitiated by Shaffer v. Heitner, so long as the
constitutionally required minimum contacts existed. This was so even
though these contacts might not suffice to provide in personamjurisdic-
tion under the local long-arm statute.25 In Intermeat a New York cor-
poration brought an action against an Ohio corporation for wrongful
rejection of a shipment of meat, delivered to defendant in Philadelphia
under a contract entered through the mediation of a Philadelphia bro-
ker. The contract had been confirmed by plaintiff's contract forms sent
from its New York headquarters; defendant did not return one of the
two copies received.
The action was commenced in the Supreme Court of New York
and removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York. Plaintiff then attached a debt owed to defendant by
one of the latter's customers doing business in New York. The district
court ruled that it lacked in personam jurisdiction, but held that it had
21. 433 U.S. at 207 n.23.
22. "We do not suggest that these illustrations include all the factors that may affect the
decision, nor that the factors we have mentioned are necessarily decisive." Id. at 208 n.28.
23. 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978).
24. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 6201, 6202 (Consol. 1963).
25. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 301, 302 (West 1972).
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quasi-in-rem jurisdiction based on the attachment because defendant
had sufficient commerical contacts with New York flowing from prior
activities as well as the transaction at issue to sustain jurisdiction. The
court of appeals affirmed, holding that "[tihe constitutional standard of
due process may be met by fewer contacts . . . than those required
under the more restrictive statutory test of 'doing business,'
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 301,. .. or the (possibly) more restrictive test of 'trans-
acting business,' N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302, since neither of these statutes
governs jurisdiction based on attachment. ' 26
In its opinion, the appellate court recognized clearly that in per-
sonam jurisdiction in New York had to satisfy the statutory tests as well
as the constitutional test, while jurisdiction based on an attachment
merely had to meet the constraints of International Shoe. In determin-
ing whether the requisite minimum contacts were present, the court
thought it decisive that the contract in issue possessed a "substantial
connection" with New York "along with the added factor of the attach-
ment of an intangible within the jurisdiction of the state."2 7 The court
thus read Heitner as including the presence of assets as an item in the
aggregate of necessary minimum contacts. The panel was neither
troubled by nor felt a need to discuss the problem of whether the lim-
ited scope of a quasi-in-rem judgment would expose the defendant to
the possibly unconstitutional burden of further litigation on the same
cause of action. 28 The court apparently was satisfied that nothing in
26. 575 F.2d at 1022.
27. Id. at 1023.
28. Until Shaffer v. Heitner resort to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction where in personamjuris-
diction was not available did not constitute an impermissible or unconstitutional splitting of
plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant could protect himself against such splitting by
making either a general appearance or a special appearance to ask for the disposition of the
action in a more appropriate forum and a stay of further proceedings until such disposition.
Moreover the majority of jurisdictions permitted limited appearance restricting maximum
liability to the value of the attached property. See Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp.
11, 16, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390, 393 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11, com-
ment g & Reporter's Note (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 40
(1942). Such limited appearance did not necessarily result in issue preclusion against de-
fendant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(e) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977);
O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 202 (2d Cir. 1978). If the local long-arm
statute permitted in personam jurisdiction but plaintiff restricted the relief sought to a quasi-
in-rem judgment, defendant apparently could resist a subsequent action on the ground of
impermissible splitting of the cause of action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§§ 61-61.2 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978). Although, following the holding of Intermeat, quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction is still available where the requisite minimum contacts are present but
the local long-arm statute does not provide in personam jurisdiction, it could be argued that
due process should protect the defendant against a subsequent in personam action in an-
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Heitner militated against its sustaining quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in the
case before it.
United States district courts likewise have upheld quasi-in-rem ju-
risdiction after Shaffer v. Heitner in cases where jurisdiction in per-
sonam could not be exercised for other than constitutional reasons. An
illustration in point is Feder v. Turkish Airlines.29 In that case, plain-
tiffs, residents of New York and executors of a decedent killed in the
crash in Turkey of one of defendant airline's aircraft, commenced an
action in personam against the defendant based on the allegation that
defendant maintained a sales agent in New York and thus was doing
business in that state within the meaning of New York Civil Practice
Law & Rules section 301. Defendants moved for dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. Discovery proceedings failed to show the existence of any
such agent but did disclose that defendant maintained an account with
a New York bank for the purpose of paying for out-of-state purchases
of replacement parts. Plaintiffs thereupon attached the account and in-
voked quasi-in-rem jurisdiction based on the attachment. The court
held that the voluntary maintenance of the New York account, while
not amounting to doing business within the state, furnished a constitu-
tionally sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction based on attach-
ment and the rendition of a quasi-in-rem judgment. According to the
court, it was unnecessary for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction that the property
attached be related to the underlying cause of action.
Another recent instance where quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was exer-
cised despite and because of the absence of statutory in personam juris-
diction is National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.30
Without recounting all the facts of this bizarre litigation, suffice it to
state that it involved an action for damages claimed by plaintiff, a Del-
aware corporation having its principal place of business in New York,
against the Federal Republic of Nigeria as the result of Nigeria's
breach of a contract for the purchase of 240,000 tons of Portland ce-
ment at a price of $14,400,000. The contract provided for issuance of
an irrevocable letter of credit by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York in the amount of the purchase price, and the Central Bank
of Nigeria deposited sufficient funds with the Morgan Guaranty Trust
other forum, even if he failed to make a special appearance to request a stay of the quasi-in-
rem action.
29. 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
30. 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). For prior phases of the litigation, see National
Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 420 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); National Am.
Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 425 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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Co. to cover the amount of the letter of credit. The Government of
Nigeria maintained, in addition, an account of $15,000,000 in United
States treasury bills with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from
which Morgan Guaranty could transfer amounts needed whenever the
level of the funds held at Morgan fell too low. Enormous port conges-
tion in Nigeria made delivery of the cement impossible and plaintiff
was unable to perform the contract. Because of this situation, and
other events, plaintiff claimed to be entitled to damages in excess of
$14,000,000 plus interest and costs based on repudiation and other
breaches of the contract by Nigeria. Having instituted its action, plain-
tiff obtained an attachment of the accounts maintained by Nigeria at
the two New York banks mentioned. Nigeria challenged the quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction of the court on several grounds, viz. lapse of the at-
tachments under New York law, absence of the constitutionally man-
dated minimum contacts for maintaining the action, and failure to
comply with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19763' which
took effect after the institution of the present action.
The district court ruled that the attachments of defendant's bank
accounts could still be perfected and that the intervening abolition of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over foreign states did not affect the procedu-
ral posture of the litigation at hand. With respect to the attack of the
attachments on the basis of Shaffer v. Heitner, the court held that the
action of plaintiff was sufficiently related to the accounts to justify the
exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. This applied to the funds held by
Morgan Guaranty to cover its letter of credit, issued to plaintiff and
claimed to have been unlawfully repudiated, and also to the funds held
by the Federal Reserve Bank, because Morgan Guaranty could with-
draw them to obtain reimbursement for honoring the letter of credit.
Again, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was held to be open to a plaintiff who
could not invoke long-arm jurisdiction because of nonconstitutional
barriers. 32
Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc. 33 was relied upon and fol-
lowed in Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. D'Angelo.34 In that case
plaintiff, a New York corporation doing business as a broker-dealer in
securities and commodities brought a quasi-in-rem action against two
31. Pub. L. No. 94-583 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A.).
32. These barriers were discussed in the instant case, 448 F. Supp. at 635, and in the
related case, 425 F. Supp. at 1368-72. For a British comparison, see Trendex Trading Corp.
v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [19771 2 W.L.R. 356.
33. 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978).
34. 453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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residents of New Jersey to recover a debit balance in defendants' joint
commodity account with plaintiff. Jurisdiction was obtained by attach-
ment of two other commodity accounts maintained by defendants at
the New York City office of a Missouri broker. The court held that
absence of jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute did not de-
prive it of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction based on defendants' maintenance
of commodity accounts and activities relating thereto. "Defendants'
activities here exceeded opening a bank account; by maintaining com-
modities accounts and regularly directing the transaction of business in
New York on their behalf, defendants knowingly assumed a predict-
able risk that they might be compelled to litigate disputes concerning
those accounts in New York."'35
A third decision of United States district courts sustaining quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction is Engineering Equioment Co. v. S.S. Selene.36 The
case involved a suit in admiralty against foreign shipowners seeking
recovery of damages for misdelivery of and injury to cargo. Pursuant
to Rule B(l) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Cases, 37 plaintiffs in their complaint prayed for a writ of at-
tachment in order to garnish the obligations of certain United States
corporations to pay charter hire to the defendants. The court diag-
nosed the procedure as one for obtaining quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and,
as mandated by Shaffer v. Heitner, inquired into the existence of suffi-
cient minimum contacts with the forum. The court concluded that, in
admiralty cases, the constitutional requirement of minimum contacts
derived from the fifth and not the fourteenth amendment, and that
therefore in the case of foreign defendants their contacts with the
United States as a whole had to be considered. In the case before the
court, the requisite minimum contacts were found to exist since defend-
ants' vessels called at the ports of the United States, and both the
claims of the plaintiffs and the obligations of the garnishees arose from
the defendants' activities in the United States. No doubt was expressed
as to the continued vitality of the jurisdiction under Supplemental Rule
B(1), so long as the requisite minimum contacts exist.38
Subsequent decisions, likewise, have upheld Supplemental Rule
35. Id. at 1298.
36. 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
37. SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS (codi-
fied in 28 U.S.C.A.).
38. 446 F. Supp. at 709-10. Actually, there seems to be no longer any need to charac-
terize jurisdiction based on Supplemental Admiralty Rule B(l) as quasi-in-rem. If sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum are present, why should the judgment not be enforceable
also against assets found or arising after the original levy?
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B(1) against attacks based on Shafer v. Heitner. In Grand Bahama Pe-
troleum Co. v. Canadian Transportation Agencies, Ltd.39 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington held in a carefully
researched opinion that maritime attachment was constitutionally per-
missible although in the instant case its execution without prior notice
and hearing violated due process. The same position was taken in
Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de
Navigation.40 In that case, however, due process was observed in that
the attachment followed New York procedure, as authorized by Sup-
plemental Rule B(l).
In contrast to this line of cases a totally different assessment of
Shaffer v. Heitner's impact on the survival of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
was voiced by Judge Tenney in Marketing Showcase Inc. v. Alberto Cul-
ver Co.4I This litigation was commenced in a New York state court as
a quasi-in-rem action prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Shaffer v. Heitner. Before out-of-state service was completed pursuant
to New York law, defendant, a Delaware corporation with headquar-
ters in Illinois, removed the suit to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Upon the handing down of Shaffer v.
Heitner defendant moved for dismissal of the action on the grounds of
lack of proper service and lack of jurisdiction. The court denied the
motion and held that the proceedings could be continued as an in per-
sonam action, provided jurisdiction could be rested on New York's
long-arm provisions. Finding that plaintiff had made out a prima facie
case for jurisdiction based on defendant's doing business in New York
within the meaning of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules section
301, the court, invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c), validated
nunc pro tunc the service made by the Deputy Sheriff of Illinois pursu-
ant to N.Y.C.P.L.R. sections 311, 313 and 314.
While the actual result of the case appears to be sound, Judge Ten-
ney's opinion is startling in that the continuation of the action was
made to depend not on the existence of minimum contacts as required
by due process but on the fulfillment of the more stringent requisites of
the local long-arm statute. The reason for this novel approach was
Judge Tenney's conclusion that in diversity cases there is no longer any
room for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction based upon state law, but that any
exercise of jurisdiction in such cases must rest on the long-arm statute
of the forum. He read Shaffer v. Heitner as having "scuttled the juris-
39. 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
40. 459 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
41. 445 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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diction base" of quasi-in-rem proceedings and found "the entire
branch of that jurisdiction" to be violative of due process.42 Judge
Tenney subsequently dissolved the attachment.43
What is Left of Pennoyer and Harris?
As has been noted, the majority in Heitner expressly declined to
rule on the continued validity, if any, of Pennoyer v. Neff44 and Harris
v. Balk,45 were the new test to be applied to the facts of those cases.
While the statements of fact included in the official reports of the
Pennoyer and Harris decisions are not sufficiently detailed to assess
conclusively the forum contacts of the causes of action asserted in these
quasi-in-rem suits, the printed records contain additional details that
throw more light on the underlying circumstances.
In Pennoyer, the judgment collaterally attacked in the action that
eventually reached the Supreme Court was rendered in an action insti-
tuted by Mitchell against Neff, the plaintiff in the suit against Pen-
noyer. Mitchell, an attorney in Portland, Oregon, who had practiced
law in that state for more than five years at the time of the commence-
ment of his action on November 3, 1865, brought the action to recover
attorney's fees for services rendered, at the request of Neff, between
January 24, 1863, and May 15, 1863". Neff had paid $6.50 on January
24, 1863, but more than $200 remained unpaid.46 Whether Neff lived
in Oregon at that time is not disclosed. At any rate, he was not in
Oregon at the time of the suit, but reputedly was in California; his
whereabouts were not known to Mitchell. The Oregon court rendered
judgment on February 19, 1866, which Mitchell enforced by executing
against a tract of land to which Neff had obtained a United States pat-
ent a month after Mitchell's judgment. Pennoyer claimed title under
the execution sale when Neff, surfacing almost nine years later, insti-
tuted proceedings in ejectment and contested the validity of Mitchell's
judgment. It would certainly seem that the requisite minimum contacts
did in fact exist with respect to Mitchell's cause of action. The compen-
sation claimed was for services rendered in the forum, under a contract
with a resident of the forum, which was concluded in the forum even if
42. Id. at 758, 760.
43. Marketing Showcase, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 457 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
44. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
45. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
46. Record at 26. While most of the relevant facts are set out in the report of the
Supreme Court decision, the verified allegation that Neff specifically requested the particu-
lar services and made a small payment therefor is not repeated in that report.
March 19791
Neff did not request the services in person but by letter from
California.
Similarly, the facts in Harris v. Balk as culled from the record 47
support the conclusion that Maryland might have exercised jurisdiction
over Balk without constitutional defects even if Harris had never made
his historic trip to Baltimore. Epstein, a resident of Maryland, was an
importer of general merchandise, doing business as the Baltimore Bar-
gain House. Harris and Balk, both retailers in North Carolina, were
his customers. Balk was indebted to Epstein in the amount of $344 for
shipments of merchandise to him in North Carolina during the fall of
1895. Balk was on friendly terms with Harris and had repeatedly lent
money to him, of which $180 remained unpaid and constituted the debt
later garnished by Epstein. When Harris went to Baltimore to
purchase merchandise from Epstein he carried a message to Epstein
from Balk regarding the settlement of Balk's debt. Thus, unless Balk
had ordered the merchandise from Epstein during visits of Epstein or
his sales force in North Carolina, Maryland's exercise of jurisdiction
over Balk would not have raised constitutional difficulties.
The Role of the Plaintigs Residence
Both Pennoyer v. Neff and Harris v. Balk involved actions by
plaintiffs who were residents of the forum state against out-of-state de-
fendants. But it is highly problematic whether residency of the plaintiff
constitutes a legitimate item in the computation of the relevant mini-
mum contacts. Certainly it would appear that residence of the plaintiff
coupled only with a mere fortuitous and transient presence of assets of
defendant standing alone would not immunize jurisdiction based
thereon against constitutional attack.
The role of plaintiff's residence as one of the relevant minimum
contacts is not easily quantified. Although there is judicial as well as
statutory authority for differentiating in the exercise of jurisdiction be-
tween resident and nonresident plaintiffs,48-a distinction invoked in
Pennoyer v. Neff-a policy of that type must at some point run afoul of
the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the
47. For an analysis of the facts that can be gleaned from the printed record, see
Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangible.'A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV.
102 (1978).
48. See the discussion of this point in Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Ren Rules: A4
Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer ;' Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600, 608, 610, 611, 613, 625
(1977).
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Constitution.49
Jurisdiction via Garnishment
Nothing in Shaffer v. Heitner impairs the teachings of Harris v.
Balk with respect to jurisdiction over the garnishee. Provided there is
jurisdiction over the absent defendant, jurisdiction over the garnishee
may be exercised whenever there is in personam jurisdiction over him.
Since transient presence of the defendant and service during such pres-
ence has not yet been overturned as a constitutionally acceptable basis
for jurisdiction over individuals,50 such jurisdiction also can be invoked
by the garnishor as statutory representative of the garnishee's credi-
tor.51 Yet, despite the silence of Shaffer on that aspect of Harris v.
Balk, it would seem that a reexamination of these principles may be
expected.
Equally open to question is the constitutionally permissible scope
of garnishment when the garnishee is an out-of-state corporation.
52 If
the doctrinal basis of garnishment is still the notion that the garnishing
creditor steps into the jurisdictional shoes of his alleged debtor, it
would follow that a foreign corporation can be garnished with respect
to all debts owing to the principal defendant or judgment debtor over
which the state could have exercised jurisdiction in an action by such
defendant or judgment debtor. While older cases base the
garnishability of foreign corporations on their acceptance of jurisdic-
tion or presence in the state of garnishment,5 3 the more recent analysis
of the foundations of an in personam jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions54 would also apply to garnishment proceedings against such cor-
porations. In other words, long-arm statutes could be invoked by
garnishors if the local garnishment statutes permit out-of-state service
49. "[Tlhe right to institute actions in the courts of another State" is one of the privi-
leges guaranteed by art. IV, § 2. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 223 (1905); accord, Ownbey v.
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 109 (1921); Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339, 346 (5th Cir.
1973).
50. This jurisdictional basis has survived Heitner according to the lower courts. See
Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 n.25 (1st Cir. 1978).
51. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905). But see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
201 n.18 (1977).
52. Attachment of a debt of a domestic corporation owed to an out-of-state corporation
was involved and upheld in Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S.
183 (1941).
53. Attachment of debts owed by foreign corporations deemed to be permanently pres-
ent in the forum issuing the attachment were involved in Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer
Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Hostetter, 240 U.S. 620 (1916); Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. v. Deer, 200 U.S. 176 (1906).
54. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203 (1977).
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of garnishment notices. 55 It has been suggested in a recent case that
garnishment must be restricted to forum-connected debts of the gar-
nishee,56 but this limitation seems to be narrower than constitutionally
required.
The Blurred Contours of Asset-Based Jurisdiction
The majority opinion in Shaffer suggested the survival of certain
categories of asset-based jurisdiction, that is, cases where the presence
of assets is in itself a dominant factor for the exercise of some type of
jurisdiction. The Court distinguished between those situations in
which jurisdiction is based on the purposeful presence of assets to
which the cause of action relates, and those cases where the purpose
behind the presence of assets is immaterial and the suit is therefore not
asset related. The latter category includes three special settings: ab-
sence of another forum, enforcement of a judgment already obtained,
and those cases in which attachment in one forum must be followed by
the institution and successful completion of an in personam action in
another forum. The lower courts were quick to resort to these escape
hatches.
Even prior to Shaffer v. Heitner, some jurisdictions permitted the
defendant in a quasi-in-rem action to make a special appearance for
the purpose of pleading forum non conveniens. The best practice fol-
lowing a granting of that motion was not dismissal of the action and
release of the attachment, but a stay of all future proceedings until a
disposition of the controversy in the proper forum.57 Justice Marshall's
opinion in Heitner gave this solution a constitutional underpinning
which was relied upon in Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex.58 In
that case, plaintiff, a North Carolina public utility company, instituted
55. Ordinarily garnishment notices must be served by a sheriff of the forum state, but a
state may permit out-of-state service. See dictum in Glenn v. Ferrell, 5 Utah 2d 439. 304
P.2d 380 (1956), and comment thereon in Riesenfeld, Creditors' Remedies and the Conflict of
Laws-Part One. Individual Collection of Claims, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 659, 679 (1960).
56. Mississippi Chem. Corp. v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss.
1977). The decision was based on an observation in Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d
339, 348 n.24 (5th Cir. 1973): "Even under the most restricted notions of situs, however,
attachment jurisdiction would be permissible here, since a portion [sic] of the monies owed
to appellee by residents of Mississippi does relate to transactions conducted in Mississippi."
Actually, the principal garnishee in Steele was a Maryland corporation owing the debt to a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. Id. at 341 n.5. The
Steele court did not intimate that the garnishment was invalid to the extent that the indebt-
edness resulted from out-of-state transactions.
57. See S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 248 n.30,
396 (2d ed. 1975).
58. 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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a quasi-in-rem action against a French business enterprise for the
breach of a contract to deliver uranium. Jurisdiction was based on the
attachment of a debt owed by a California-based corporation under a
contract with Uranex to ship uranium to two states other than Califor-
nia. Except for these funds in California, Uranex had no contacts with
the forum. The contract between plaintiff and Uranex provided for ar-
bitration in New York and the parties initiated such proceedings subse-
quent to the attachment. Some time after the service of the
garnishment notice, Shaffer v. Heitner was decided; defendant there-
upon moved for dismissal on the grounds that the forum lacked suffi-
cient contacts for the exercise of jurisdiction, and that no attachment
could be maintained pending arbitration proceedings. The court re-
jected both contentions and held that while it was without jurisdiction
to adjudicate the merits of the controversy, it did have the power to
order an attachment of defendant's property as security for a recovery
by plaintiff. The court rationalized that such property was likely to be
the only source for the collection of a sister state judgment and its pres-
ence in the forum was not merely fortuitous.: 9
The absence of any forum with in personam jurisdiction and the
previous recovery of a judgment in another forum by plaintiff were
invoked as grounds for jurisdiction based on the mere presence of as-
sets in Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co. 60 and in Rich v. Rich.61
In the former case the court held that absence of another forum within
the United States permitted it to exercise jurisdiction in an action
against a Kuwait corporation commenced by garnishment of a debt
owed to defendant by a corporation incorporated and maintaining an
office in the forum state. In Rich defendant allegedly owed plaintiff
unpaid alimony under a Mexican divorce decree. Defendant was a res-
ident of France, but had inherited an estate in New York. The New
York Supreme Court held that under these circumstances it could at-
tach the property and exercise jurisdiction based on that attachment.
Of course, in the case of the enforcement of a sister-state judgment, the
arguments for asset-based jurisdiction are even stronger in view of the
full faith and credit clause.62
Undoubtedly, the most troublesome cases of asset-based jurisdic-
59. The court maintained the attachment for 30 days, during which time plaintiff was
to file an action in a forum having in personam jurisdiction over Uranex. Apparently the
attachment was to be extended if such action was filed during that interval.
60. 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977).
61. 93 Misc. 2d 409, 402 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
62. See Riesenfeld, Creditors'Remedies and the Conflict of Laws-Part One. Individudl
Collection of Claims, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 659, 664 (1960). For a recent resort to quasi-in-rem
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tion will be those where the presence of the property provides the dom-
inant contact with the forum because defendant sought the benefits of
protection by the forum of his interest, and the cause of action in some
fashion relates to the property. 63 Unfortunately, the outer limits of ju-
risdiction based on the purposeful presence of property remains
shrouded in mystery,64 especially since the Supreme Court, as dis-
cussed above, in Heitner never clearly stated whether the standards of
International Shoe require identical contacts for those adjudications not
limited as to their recognition and enforceability, and those adjudica-
tions binding or enforceable only with respect to specific property inter-
ests. From the illustrations given by the majority opinion, it seems to
follow that a state has jurisdiction to enforce consensual security inter-
ests in realty as well as in chattels 65 located within its boundaries at the
time the action is commenced. This conceptualization would include
situations where the secured party intended the chattels to be present in
that state, and perhaps even cases where the chattels were brought by
the debtor to that state per nefas. There would, however, be no juris-
diction to render an in personam judgment for the deficiency, unless
the secured debt itself arose out of a transaction furnishing the requisite
contacts.
A special problem is presented by the jurisdictional effects of
opening a bank account in a particular state, a manifest source of ag-
ony for the lower courts. Justice Stevens clearly anticipated further
difficulties with that issue in his concurring opinion criticizing the
majority opinion for the uncertainty of its reach: "If I. .. open a bank
account in [another state], I knowingly assume some risk that the state
will exercise its power over my property . . . while there. My contact
jurisdiction to collect a sister-state judgment, see David M. Rice, Inc. v. Intrex, Inc., 257
N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 1977).
63. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207, 208 (1977).
64. Although the majority opinion, in analyzing the significance of a purposeful pres-
ence of property, invoked the rationale of Hanson v. Denckla, id. at 208 n.26. it warned
immediately that its catalogue of factors determining jurisdiction was neither inclusive nor
conclusive, id. at 208 n.28.
65. The enforcement of security interests in chattels is governed by U.C.C. § 9-501(1) &
(5), permitting either foreclosure or action on the secured debt and levy on the collateral. In
view of § 9-501(5) it should be immaterial that the secured creditor proceeds by quasi-in-
rem action on the underlying debt and levy of execution rather than by foreclosure. It is
clear that the state where the chattel is located should have jurisdiction to enforce rights in
the chattel and that such determination is entitled to full faith and credit. This applies even
if the presence in the forum is in violation of the security agreement. See Curry v. McCan-
less, 307 U.S. 357, 363 (1939); Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139 (1868); Green v.
Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307 (1866); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 60, 247 (1971).
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with the state, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks. ' 66 While
the opening of a bank account by a foreign corporation, standing alone,
does not constitute "doing business" within the meaning of statutes
governing long-arm jurisdiction,67 it has been held even after Shaffer v.
Heitner that such an action will support quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, at
least with respect to any transactions sought to be facilitated by the
opening of the account.68 Some courts have indicated a willingness to
be satisfied with a rather loose nexus between the establishment of the
account and the transaction underlying the suit. Thus, it has been held
that maintenance of a checking account, established in Colorado by a
New York publisher to receive subscription fees paid for a magazine
printed in and mailed from Florida, furnished a sufficient jurisdictional
basis for an in personam action by the Florida printer against the New
York publisher to recover a balance remaining on the printing bill al-
ready paid in part by a check on the Colorado account. 69 Similarly, in
the aforementioned Feder case,70 the presence of a bank account estab-
lished to facilitate purchase of aircraft parts or components was held to
furnish a sufficient basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in an action by
New York residents for wrongful death caused by an airplane crash
abroad. It is worth noting that the absence of another forum could in
all probability have been invoked as an equally or perhaps even more
appropriate7' ground for jurisdiction.
The Fate of Seider v. Roth
Three days after its decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme
Court vacated a judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court72 that had
adopted as Minnesota law New York's controversial Seider v. Roth73
doctrine. The case was remanded for further consideration in the light
66. 433 U.S. at 218.
67. National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 425 F. Supp. 1365, 1369
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing authorities).
68. "The funds held by Morgan were the source of payments. . . which would have
been made but for the disputes which, subsequently arose. Therefore, these funds would
appear to have a sufficient nexus to plaintiff's cause of action to justify their attachment as a
basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction." National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448
F. Supp. 622, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
69. At Home Magazine v. District Court, 572 P.2d 476 (Colo. 1977).
70. 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see text accompanying note 29 supra.
71. In O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 639 (1978), Judge Friendly intimated that a tortfeasor's maintaining bank accounts,
without other contacts with the forum, would not be a sufficient contact for attachment juris-
diction in an action for personal injuries suffered outside the forum.
72. Savchuck v. Rush, 245 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976).
73. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
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of Shaffer v. Heitner.7 4 The Supreme Court of Minnesota adhered to
its former holding.75
Seider v. Roth permits the victim of an accident outside the forum
state causing personal injury to obtain jurisdiction over the alleged
nonresident tortfeasor by garnishing the latter's liability insurer, pro-
vided the insurer does business within the forum. Under New York
law the liability of the insurer to defend and indemnify the insured
constitutes a garnishable debt7 6 which in the case of drivers of motor
vehicles cannot be rendered nongarnishable by the wording of the pol-
icy. Seider v. Roth had been reaffirmed repeatedly by the New York
Court of Appeals including a decision handed down only a few weeks
before the Shaffer decision.77 Under New York law only resident
plaintiffs can invoke the benefits of the rule.
As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Shaffer P. Heitner
state and federal lower courts quickly reached conflicting results with
respect to the survival of Seider.78 Finally, however, the New York
Court of Appeals 79 as well as the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit 80 held that the Seider doctrine was in conformity with the Supreme
Court's new jurisdictional standards. As he had done over nine years
earlier,8 ' Judge Friendly, in a carefully considered opinion again con-
cluded that the New York practice could not be toppled on due process
grounds. The principal rationale for this holding was "that a judgment
for the plaintiff will not deprive a defendant of anything substantial
that would have otherwise been useful to him,"'82 and that such judg-
ment would not possibly have an adverse effect upon him since
"neither New York nor any other state could constitutionally give col-
74. 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
75. Savchuck v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978).
76. Contra, Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768
(1976) (citing authorities); Belcher v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 46 U.S.L.W. 2684
(Md. App. 1978).
77. Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977):
Neuman v. Dunham, 39 N.Y.2d 999, 355 N.E.2d 294 (1976); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21
N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1968).
78. The relevant case law is surveyed in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d
194, 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978). Torres v. Towmotor Div. of Caterpillar,
Inc. is now reported in 457 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
79. Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110, 410 N.Y.S. 808 (1978).
80. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
639 (1978).
81. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), adhered to en bane. 410 F.2d
117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
82. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 639 (1978).
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lateral estoppel effect to a Seider judgment when the whole theory be-
hind this procedure is that it is in effect a direct action against the
insurer and that the latter rather than the insured will conduct the
defense."8 3
Unfortunately neither Judge Friendly nor the New York Court of
Appeals discussed the problems created by the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution and by the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. This issue had been
left undecided by the New York Court of Appeals' most recent affirma-
tion of Seider prior to Shaffer v. Heitner because it had not been raised
by the parties in the lower courts.8 4 Thus the possible survival of Seider
v. Roth again poses the question of the role of plaintiffs residence
among the permissible relevant contacts supporting jurisdiction in per-
sonam or quasi-in-rem. 85 While both constitutional clauses prohibit
discriminatory exclusion of citizens of sister states from judicial reme-
dies available to citizens of the forum, 86 they do leave room for reason-
able preferential protection of local residents. Of course, the dividing
line is not easy to draw. For example, wholesale denial of the protec-
tion of the local long-arm statute to non-residents might overshoot the
mark of reasonable differentiation. 87 Similarly in the specific context
of the Seider doctrine a better case can be made for reserving its protec-
tion to local residents who were such when the out-of-state injury oc-
curred rather than to plaintiffs who moved into the forum only after the
accident. The first alternative seems to represent the law of New
York,8 8 while the second one applies in Minnesota.8 9
Parallel Developments Abroad
It is worth noting that the renewed concern for fair and just
grounds of jurisdiction is by no means confined to the United States.
The most important foreign example of parallel development is the
83. Id. at 201 (quoting Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1968)).
84. Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 216 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977).
85. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
86. See note 49 & accompanying text supra with respect to the privileges and immuni-
ties clause.
87. Contra, Breeland v. Hide-A-Way Lake, Inc., 585 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1978).
Breeland holds that the privileges and immunities clause is not violated by Mississippi's
denial to citizens of sister states the benefits of the local long-arm statute which subjects
nonresidents doing business within the state to in personam jurisdiction. The court seemed
to overlook that the precedents cited involved corporations, which are not protected by art.
IV, § 2 of the Constitution, while the case at bar involved individuals.
88. Fish v. Bamby Bakers, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 511 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
89. Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978).
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Convention among the members of the European Communities on Ju-
risdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters of 1968,90 as amended by the Convention on Accession of the
Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland to that Convention.91 Although the national
laws of the member states-varying in that respect from state to
state-establish nationality or residence of the plaintiff, or presence or
presence and seizure of property of the defendant, or service of process
on the defendant during a transient presence as a valid foundation of
jurisdiction, the Convention proscribes such bases of jurisdiction as
"exorbitant" and inapplicable to persons domiciled in one of the other
member states. 92 Hence these grounds of jurisdiction remain applica-
ble only with respect to defendants domiciled outside the Communi-
ties. While judgments against debtors domiciled in a non-Community
country resting on one of the proscribed grounds must be recognized
and enforced in the other Community countries, a member state may
be freed from that obligation if it has concluded a convention with a
third country not to recognize and enforce such judgments.93
The new trend was alluded to by the House of Lords in the case of
The Siskiwa.94 In its judgment their Lordships refused to affirm a deci-
sion of the Court of Appeal which held that English courts possessed
jurisdiction to enjoin the disposition by Panamanian shipowners of in-
surance moneys payable in England on the application of foreign cargo
owners to secure the payment of damage claims not within the jurisdic-
tion of the English courts. The judgment of the House of Lords held
that without specific action to that effect by the Rules Committee, Eng-
90. The text of the so-called Brussels Convention of 1968, which went into effect
among the original six members of the European Communities on February 1, 1973 is re-
printed in 8 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 229 (1969). In its original form the Con-
vention declared certain jurisdictional provisions found in the laws of Belgium,
Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to be inapplicable to defendants
domiciled in the Communities. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 3, discussed by Droz, Enir~e en vigueur de la Conven-
tion de Bruxelles concernant la compotence ludiciaire el /'execution des decisions en matiere
civilet commercial, 62 REV. CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 21, 29 (1973). Sim-
ilar provisions are included in the Supplementary Protocol to the Draft Hague Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, § 4 (1966), reprintedin 6 INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1083 (1967).
91. COMMON MARKET REP. (CCH) 6003. The Convention of Accession, which ad-
ded additional instances of proscribed exhorbitant jurisdiction found in the laws of the three
new entrants, was signed in October 1978, but is as yet not ratified by all parties thereto.
92. Brussels Convention of 1968, art. 3 (as amended).
93. Brussels Convention of 1968, arts. 26, 31, 59 (as amended).
94. [1977] 3 W.L.R. 818.
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lish courts were not authorized to grant protective measures in cases
which on their merits are not subject to the jurisdiction, including long-
arm jurisdiction, of the High Court. Lord Diplock noted expressly that
other Community countries claimed such jurisdiction and that this
power was expressly recognized by Article 24 of the Brussels
Convention.
The approach alluded to by Lord Diplock corresponds to that fol-
lowed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
in the Uranex case mentioned above.95 That approach is standard
practice in France96 and has been applied recently by a German Appel-
late Court in a case within the jurisdiction of another Community
nation.97
Conclusions
Shaffer v. Heutner appears at first blush as a decision of revolution-
ary character, effecting a radical change in the doctrinal bases of juris-
diction. Unfortunately, its implications and ramifications remain quite
nebulous and are bound to necessitate further clarification. Its reper-
cussions in the case law of the lower courts amply demonstrates this
assessment. In particular, three fundamental questions are prompted
by the majority and separate opinions of the Justices.
The first of these queries concerns the ultimate survival of quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction as a separate branch ofjurisdiction. As noted in the
majority opinion, the two essential attributes of a quasi-in-rem judg-
ment for the payment of money are its limited enforceability against
assets of the judgment debtor, excluding property not seized at the
commencement of the action, and its limited res judicata effects and
lack of entitlement to full faith and credit in sister states. Shaffer v.
Heitner postulates that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe
and its progeny."98 The opinion recognizes that this holding will con-
95. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977). See
text accompanying note 58 supra.
96. For an illustration see Soc. Intrabank c. Veuve Beidas (Tribunal de Grande In-
stance de Paris, Jan. 14, 1970) in 59 REV. CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvi 714
(1970). The court permited garnishment of a debt owed to a foreign non-resident defendant
by a foreign non-resident plaintiff but stayed further proceedings until commencement
within three months of proceedings in the appropriate foreign forum.
97. Appellate Court, DUsseldorf (May 18, 1977), in 30 N.J.W. 2034 (1977). The hold-
ing is criticized in Dittner, Der Arresigrund der Auslandsvollstreckung, 31 N.J.W. 1720
(1978).
98. 433 U.S. at 212.
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tract the traditional scope of jurisdiction so that "cases over which the
State is now thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in that
forum." 99 But applicability of a common, minimum-contacts test
which cannot be satisfied by the mere presence of property does not
automatically mandate identical contacts' 00 for in personam and quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction, especially in view of the more limited effect of a
quasi-in-rem adjudication. Thus, even if all states were to extend their
long-arm statutes to the constitutional limits of in personam jurisdic-
tion, it might still be conceivable that situations would remain where
only quasi-in-rem jurisdiction would be constitutionally permissible.
A second problem prompted by the reorientation of the constitu-
tional basis of jurisdiction pertains to the relevance of the residence of
plaintiff to the minimum-contacts test used to determine the propriety
of exercising adjudicatory power. May residence of the plaintiff be
considered in balancing the demands of fairness and substantial justice,
or would such concession violate the privileges and immunities clause
of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution?
The third of the conceivable major implications of Shaffer '.
Heitner is the demise of jurisdiction based on temporary presence
within the state. If territorial limitations are no longer of "central con-
cern" for personal jurisdiction,' 0 ' it would seem that "mere" personal
presence would lose its significance in the same way as "mere" presence
of property.
Actually the decision leaves so many escape hatches that it is
doubtful whether in the end a dramatic change in actual practice will
result. Certainly the holding will prompt the States to extend their
long-arm statutes to the constitutional limits. 0 2 The flood of new cases
construing the local long-arm provisions shows already that resort to
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is no longer favored by plaintiffs. If approved
99. Id. at 209.
I00. While Shaffer v. Heitner is very specific on the proposition that "the same test ap-
plies to jurisdiction in rem as governs jurisdiction inpersonam," id. at 207, it is not equally
specific on the issue whether that text mandates the same contacts for both types of adjudica-
tion. Only if the same test requires the same contacts is separate quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
really scuttled.
101. Id. at 204.
102. The implications of Shaffer v. Heitner on the permissible scope of long-arm juris-
diction is not discussed in this Article. For an appraisal, see Note, Measuring the Long Arm
After Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 126 (1978). One example might illustrate the
difficulties: D, a resident of California, executed a deed with a covenant of quiet enjoyment
to Oregon land. P, a successor in interest to the original grantee, is ousted by the holder of a
superior title. P's action on the covenant is "local" and can only be brought in Oregon.
Does Oregon have jurisdiction? Would it be relevant, if D has other assets in Oregon?
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by the U.S. Supreme Court, properly advised creditors will follow the
path pursued in the Uranex case and try to attach local assets, subject
to a stay until the controversy can be litigated in an appropriate juris-
diction. Thus in the long run the main effect of Shaffer v. Heitner may
consist in attributing a constitutional and mandatory dimension to the
classical doctrine of the more convenient forum.

